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 Brentanos use of the term Intentional inexistence is taken to imply that Intentional
objects are located in the mind of the thinker.
2 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 88.
Chapter One  Introduction
The concept of Intentionality was first introduced by the Medieval Scholastic
philosophers in order to explain the connection between thoughts and the world, but we
owe our modern use of the term to Brentano, who reintroduced it in the nineteenth
century.  According to Brentano, Intentionality is the quality that characterizes mental
states  their being about something.  He claims that 
every mental phenomenon is characterized by . . . the [I]ntentional (or
mental) inexistence1 of an object, and what we might call, though not
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an
object (which is not to be understood as meaning a thing), or immanent
objectivity.2 
Thus my mental state of believing that George Bush is the president of the United States
and my mental state of desiring that George Bush not be the president of the United
States are both Intentional in that they are about George Bush.  Brentanos theory of
Intentionality differs from that of most modern analytic philosophers in that it is
characterized by his assertion that we should posit the existence of such things as
Intentional objects; a notion that has been rejected since it leads to, the scourge of
modern philosophy, an overly complicated ontology. 
Brentano's theory of Intentionality is characterized by two further claims.  The
23Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 88.
4Ibid., 89.
5Physicalism here is the metaphysical claim that all there is is physical stuff and its
 properties.  This I take to be a less strong claim than reductionism which would be
 physicalism with the added premise that everything is described best in terms of  this
 physical stuff.
first is that Intentionality is a characteristic that belongs to every mental state.  Brentano
claims that every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself,
although they do not all do so in the same way.3   The second claim is that Intentionality
belongs only to mental states.  According to Brentano, [I]ntentional in-existence is
characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena.  No physical phenomenon exhibits
anything like it.4  The first has caused debate among those who believe that
Intentionality and consciousness are co-extensional and those who believe that they are
not; for example, Searle believes that there are conscious states that are not Intentional.  
Brentano's second claim is less innocuous in that, if it were true that only mental
states exhibit Intentionality, we seem to have a problem when trying to connect
Intentionality with the physical world, which we must do if we are to accept physicalism.5 
If Intentionality cannot be reduced to any non-mental phenomenon then, in order for
Intentionality to be compatible with physicalism, some non-mental things must exhibit
Intentionality.  If only mental things are Intentional then Intentional realism and
physicalism would be mutually exclusive.  It appears as though philosophers face a
dilemma; we must either reject physicalism or reject Intentional realism -- claiming that
beliefs, desires etc. are not real.  Many philosophers have been content to reject
Intentional realism but I agree with Searle that this rejection is just as counter-intuitive as
3a rejection of physicalism.  It is this dilemma that the attempts to naturalize Intentionality
are trying to resolve.  There are two main ways that Intentionality has been naturalized in
the past, both of which have been rejected by Searle.  
The first is to show that there are non-mental things which exhibit Intentionality
and that mental Intentionality can then be explained in terms of this non-mental
Intentionality.  This would be the method taken by Dretske in his information-theoretic
account of Intentionality.  Dretske argues that Intentionality is not a characteristic only of
the mental but that Intentionality is exhibited by any system that carries information. 
Since the Intentionality of language (or of any system) is real Intentionality, (i.e., the
same Intentionality as is seen in conscious states) the Intentionality of the mental can be
explained in terms of the Intentionality of language.  While Searle also believes that a
study of the Intentionality of language can help explain the Intentionality of the mind he
rejects this method of naturalizing Intentionality because, he claims, non-mental forms of
Intentionality (such as are found in speech acts) are cases of derived Intentionality, i.e.
are derived from the underlying mental states that produce and are expressed in speech
acts, whereas mental Intentionality is intrinsic, and thus, in an ontological order of
description, mental Intentionality must precede non-mental Intentionality.  
The second attempt at naturalizing Intentionality we owe to Ruth Millikan who
offers a teleosemantic approach to Intentionality.  Millikan claims that in order for
something to have Intentionality or content it must be able to represent an object.  She
argues that it is only possible to have a representation if it is possible for the object to be
misrepresented.  To misrepresent an object is to malfunction.  Millikan claims that
46Searle, Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle. 
7Searle, Intentionality.
something can only be said to malfunction if it has a proper function to begin with. 
Therefore, function precedes Intentionality and function is necessary (but not sufficient)
for Intentionality.  Millikan argues that biological selection is a method of design, and
that this design is the source of function, and this function is the source of Intentionality
or content.  Thus, Intentionality can be reduced to function.  The problem with this,
according to Searle, is that there are many cases of indeterminate function in biology. 
Searle argues that in the cases of indeterminate function the function is determined based
upon the interests and underlying assumptions of the person doing the study.  In
Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: A Reply6 Searle argues that
since the assignment of function seems to require Intentionality, Intentionality must
precede function.
Searle attempts to naturalize Intentionality in an entirely different way than
Millikan or Dretske.  He attempts to show that questions about content are not
ontological questions at all.  Therefore, the claim that intrinsic Intentionality is found only
in mental states does not threaten physicalism.  While Searle explains Intentionality by
appealing to non-mental forms of Intentionality (specifically linguistic forms), and while
he believes that there is a direct logical connection between mental Intentionality and
non-mental non-Intentional objects (through Intentional causation),7 Searle disagrees that
there is a form of intrinsic Intentionality to be found in non-mental states or objects. 
Searle's naturalization of Intentionality occurs through his theory of Intentional causation,
5which shows that there is a logical connection between physical objects and the
Intentional states that are about them.
Searle thus argues that, rather than naturalizing Intentionality by showing that
there are non-mental objects that exhibit intrinsic Intentionality, or that mental
Intentionality can be reduced to a form of physical Intentionality, Intentionality should be
naturalized by showing that the question of Intentionality is compatible with the natural
sciences in that it is not an ontological question at all.  According to Searle the question
what is Intentionality? results in an answer about logical structure.  The connection
between Intentionality and objects in the external world is thus a logical one.
The most pressing questions that need to be answered in a discussion of
Intentionality are what it would mean for an Intentional state to be true, how Intentional
states can refer to non-existent objects, what the connection is between Intentionality,
mental states, and consciousness, and whether the content of an Intentional state is
determined internally to the agent having the Intentional state or externally.  In
Intentionality and Rediscovery of the Mind Searle attempts to give a unified account of
Intentionality that answers all of these questions, largely by relying upon an analogy
between the Intentionality of language and the Intentionality of the mental.  While having
a definition of Intentionality that can answer all of these questions is valuable, Searles
theory of Intentionality can be said to greatly affect the philosophy of mind in that Searle
resolves the apparent contradiction between Intentional realism and physicalism that was
outlined by Quine and Chisholm without requiring the underlying theory of mind to be
reductionist.  Since a discussion of whether Intentional states are real is a topic too large
6for this thesis, I will be taking for granted for my present purposes that Intentional states
do exist and thus will be concentrating on showing that Intentional realism and
physicalism are not truly at odds with one another.
I will argue that Searle succeeds at providing the foundation for a naturalistic
account of Intentionality through his discussion of the Intentionality of perception and
introduction of the notion of Intentional causation.  Searles account has been criticized
on the grounds that it requires the introduction of a sense of causation that deviates from
the standard regularity account.  In so far as this deviation leaves us with a sense of
causation that is still compatible with scientific uses of the term, while encompassing the
common-sense uses, this amendment to standard regularity causation is not a sufficient
reason to reject Searles theory of Intentionality.  
If one agreed with Brentano that all conscious mental states are Intentional then
Searles naturalistic account of Intentionality would go a long way towards naturalizing
the mind.  Searle does not agree with Brentano on this point, however, and thus claims
that he has only made a step towards naturalizing the mind.  This step would be that of
solving the problem of Intentionality; however, the problem of phenomenal consciousness
(or qualia) would still need to be accounted for in a naturalistic theory of consciousness. 
I disagree with Searle on this point and claim that in naturalizing Intentionality a far
greater step has been made toward naturalizing the mind than Searle believes.  This is
because I disagree that it is possible to have Intentional states that are not conscious and I
disagree with Searles claim that undirected phenomenal states are possible.  Thus a
solution to the problem of Intentionality is also a solution to the problem of phenomenal
7consciousness, and Searles theory of Intentionality succeeds in laying the groundwork
for a theory of mind that is both accessible to the natural sciences and non-reductionist.  
In the following chapters I will defend Searles theory of Intentionality by
addressing certain criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other
accounts of Intentionality.  I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it
provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity
problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of
particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim
that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful.  I will also
defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that
function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I
will also argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of
perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory of Intentionality.  In the
conclusion of my thesis I will address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of
Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind
that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.   
88  Searle, Mind, Language and Society, 85. 
9 Searle, Intentionality, 2.
Chapter Two  Searles Definition of Intentionality
Searle claims that Intentionality is the general term for all the various forms by
which the mind can be directed at, or be about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the
world.8  To be a directed state for Searle means, roughly, that it makes sense to ask what
it is about.  For instance, if I have the state characterized as the belief in Santa Claus then
this state is directed since the question what is this state about? is comprehensible.  If I
have the state characterized as boredom (or another emotion with no content) then,
according to Searle, this state is not directed since the question what is this state about?
seems to make no sense.
Searle's theory of Intentionality differs from some other theories in that he claims
that many conscious states are not Intentional, e.g., a sudden sense of elation, and many
Intentional states are not conscious, e.g., I have many beliefs that I am not thinking about
at present and I may never have thought of.9  According to Searle, we have some mental
states, for example, some cases of anxiety or other emotions, which are not about
anything and are, therefore, undirected.  Searle also distinguishes between consciousness
and Intentionality by claiming that there are some forms of Intentionality that are not
conscious.  One example of Intentionality that is not conscious would be any of my
910Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 84.
beliefs that I am not thinking about at this moment.  Searle claims that, while some
people would argue that consciousness is always consciousness of, this is not the same
"aboutness" relation as in Intentionality.  The difference, according to Searle, between a
state that is directed and therefore Intentional and a state that is still of but not
Intentional is that in the latter case there is no difference between the state and what it is
about.  As an example of this difference Searle argues that if we have a case of anxiety
that we dont have a reason for, then this anxiety is not Intentional because the state and
the anxiety are both the same thing.  If we have a case of anxiety that is caused by our
inability to pay the mortgage on our home then this anxiety is Intentional because it has
the right sort of aboutness.  Therefore, there is always a content of consciousness
(there is always something that our conscious state is of) but, for Searle, this content is
not always Intentional.  He argues that pains are a good example of a conscious state that
is not Intentional because "if I am conscious of a pain, the pain is not Intentional, because
it does not represent anything beyond itself".10  One obvious counter to this claim is that
when we have a pain what the pain is directed at is a part of our body and, therefore,
pains are Intentional as well.  Searle solves this problem by admitting that the sense in
which pains refer to a part of the body is Intentional because this has conditions of
satisfaction (for example, in the case of phantom limbs, the condition of satisfaction is not
met).  However, Searle argues, most pains do not exhibit the same sort of about-ness
relation as states that are truly Intentional.
Searle appears to be drawing a line here between consciousness and Intentionality
10
that does not hold up under scrutiny.  Firstly, since phenomenal states (even those about
themselves) are still directed, the line that Searle is drawing here seems very arbitrary. 
The only way, it seems to me, that Searle could justify maintaining this distinction is if he
was to appeal to the inner/outer distinction that he explicitly rejects in Rediscovery of the
Mind.  This is because the only difference between truly Intentional states and states that
Searle wants to characterize as non-Intentional would be that the former are about
something in the external world whereas the latter can be said to be about nothing but the
person having the state or their internal life.  
The second problem is that there is good argument that the states that Searle is
describing (undirected phenomenal states) do not actually exist.  All of Searles examples
of these states are cases of emotion where we are taking the word of the person suffering
from the emotion that the emotion has no aboutness other than the emotion itself.  As
Patricia Greenspan points out in Emotions and Reasons it is more likely in these cases
that the person suffering from the emotion is just not self-aware enough to determine the
true object of their emotion.  She outlines cases which seem to show that people are not
always reliable sources when it comes to their emotions.  Searles rejection of certain
emotions Intentionality could be motivated by the fact that with emotion there is not
always a direct link between the cause of the emotion and the object of the emotion as
there seems to be in other Intentional states.  I can be angry due to my not having slept
well the night before but have the object of my emotion as my coffee maker not working
quickly enough.  That there is not always a direct connection between the object and
cause of emotions would be a case for rejecting all emotions as Intentional, not just some
11
of them.  This would be a more reasonable approach since emotions seem to provide the
greatest counter to Searles claims later on that Intentional states have a direct logical
connection to their object.  Rejecting emotions as Intentional outright, however, is also
problematic since the line distinguishing emotions and other conscious processes is not
clear.  In order for Searle to argue that emotions are non-Intentional while other
conscious states are Intentional, he needs to find a way to draw this dividing line between
emotions and other conscious states.  Arguing instead that emotions are Intentional in the
same way that other mental states are would be far easier.  This would also allow Searles
theory to do more work since all phenomenal states would be Intentional in the same
way.  In Chapter Four I will explain why emotions cant be used as a counter to Searles
theory; therefore, accepting that all phenomenal states are directed would not cause
problems for Searles theory of Intentional causation.
2.1 Intrinsic vs. Derived Intentionality
Part of Searles rejection of a Dretskean form of naturalized Intentionality is that
Searle believes that there is a distinction between derived and intrinsic Intentionality that
cant be conflated.  Searle distinguishes between intrinsic, derived, and "as-if" or
metaphorical Intentionality.  According to Searle, a statement of the type "I am hungry
right now" expresses the intrinsic Intentionality of my mental states and perceptions, a
statement like "In French J-ai grand faim en ce moment means I am very hungry right
now" expresses the derived Intentionality of language, and a statement like "the plants in
my garden are hungry for nutrients" expresses the as-if Intentionality of plant-states. 
12
11Searle, Mind, Language and Society, 93.
12Ibid., 94.
13 Searle, Intentionality, 27.
14Ibid., 4.
15Ibid., 5.
Searle claims that there are two kinds of genuine Intentionality, intrinsic and derived, but
as-if Intentionality is not a third kind.  Ascriptions of as-if Intentionality are
metaphorical11.  The difference between intrinsic and derived Intentionality is that 
intrinsic Intentionality is observer-independent  I have a state of
hunger regardless of what any observer thinks.  Derived Intentionality
is observer-dependent  it is only in relation to observers, users, and so
on, that, for example, a sentence of French has the meaning it has.12  
Intrinsic Intentionality is found in mental states like beliefs, desires, etc. and derived
Intentionality is found in language.  An utterance can have Intentionality, just as a belief
has Intentionality, but whereas the Intentionality of the belief is intrinsic the Intentionality
of the utterance is derived.13  Searle argues that Intentional states represent objects and
states of affairs in the same sense of represent that speech acts represent objects and
states of affairs14 but that language is derived from [intrinsic] Intentionality and not
conversely.15  Searle justifies this distinction by claiming that if we rejected the
distinction between derived and intrinsic Intentionality everything would become mental
since everything can be interpreted in such a way as to have derived Intentionality.
As discussed in the introduction, Searle's distinction between derived and intrinsic
Intentionality has a significant impact on his theory of language and meaning, as well as
his theory of mind, since it means that the referential nature of the human mind cannot be
reduced to the referential properties of language.  This is because it is the Intentionality
13
16Searle, Intentionality, 27.
of the mental that leads to linguistic Intentionality.  I agree that this distinction is a
valuable one to make, however in order for this distinction to be convincing the question
of how exactly Intentionality is imposed by the mind upon sentences needs to be
answered. 
2.2 Conditions of Satisfaction
Searle claims that the mind imposes Intentionality on entities that are not
intrinsically Intentional by intentionally conferring the conditions of satisfaction of the
expressed psychological state upon the external physical entity.16  Thus a statement like
"John is a bachelor" becomes Intentional when we impose conditions of satisfaction or
truth conditions upon it (namely, that John actually be a bachelor).  While this account of
Intentionality seems to answer questions of how languages get their meaning and how it
is possible for them to refer, it leaves us with another, possibly more difficult, question. 
The Intentionality of the mind is taken as a brute fact.  The only answer given to the
question of why mental states refer or have meaning is "they just do".  This explains what
is meant by those who criticize Searles theory of mind for relying upon the magic of
neurons.  
Searle attempts to partially answer this criticism by giving an evolutionary
description of "why" the mind is Intentional.  He argues that Intentionality is what allows
our minds to deal with complex situations and to evaluate large amounts of novel
information at once.  All this seems to succeed at doing is pointing out the possible
14
advantages of consciousness, which was not mysterious to begin with.  However, by
connecting Intentionality to evolutionary traits Searle has succeeded in giving a stronger
reason for us to believe that a study of the neurons of the brain will lead, in the future, to
an explanation of how these neurons cause mental states.  This stance smacks of Paul
Churchlands repeated claims that science will eventually solve our problems about the
mind thus we should just put our faith in it.  I am willing to accept Searles use of this
argument even while I reject Churchlands since, in my opinion, someone offering a
counter-intuitive description of the mind (as Churchland does) needs to go further than
merely claim that proof for their position will be found in the future, whereas someone
who offers a common-sense view of the mind (Searle) is justified in accepting that all
problems of the mind have not been solved but will be.  This is because making a
metaphysical assumption that is contrary to, or beyond, my direct experience (such as the
assumption that my pain is ontologically eliminable in favour of neuron firings) requires a
higher burden of proof.  Certainly Searles theory does not become waterproof until the
referential power of the human mind is fully explained, but neither are there any serious
arguments against the view that the human mind has this power.
2.3 The Connection Principle
One of the other aspects of Searles theory of Intentionality that has come under
attack is what he calls the connection principle.  This is his explanation of the
connection between Intentionality and consciousness and has come under attack, since
underlying this description is Searles assumption that function is not ontologically prior
15
17Searle, Mind, Language and Society, 65.
18Searle, Intentionality, 132.
19Searle, Mind, Language and Society, 76.
20Manson, Consciousness, 141.
to consciousness or Intentionality.  While Searle believes that Intentionality is an essential
characteristic of consciousness he disagrees with some who claim that Intentionality is all
that there is to consciousness.  Searle describes the connection between Intentionality and
consciousness by introducing what he calls the connection principle.  He argues that
not all Intentional states are conscious and not all conscious states are Intentional but that
"there is an essential connection: we only understand Intentionality in terms of
consciousness".17  He argues that "only a being that could have conscious Intentional
states could have Intentional states at all, and every unconscious Intentional state is at
least potentially conscious".18  So, while Searle believes that it is possible to have
Intentional mental states that are not conscious, something can only be an Intentional
state if it is open to consciousness.  Likewise, according to Searle, it is impossible to
have a mental state that is in principle closed to consciousness.  He argues that "the
attribution of a mental state to an agent is either an attribution of a conscious state or the
attribution of a state that is the sort of thing that could be conscious".19  Searle claims
that only beings with consciousness could have intrinsic Intentionality because "it is only
consciousness that provides a plausible basis for the perspectival nature of Intentional
content".20  (Through most of the discussion Searle uses the term "aspectual shape"
instead of perspectival nature.)  
Searle's claim that all Intentional states must, in principle, be of the type that they
16
21Jacob, Consciousness, Intentionality and Function, 197.
are potentially mental states and thus potentially conscious states is clearly influenced by
his acceptance of the distinction between derived and intrinsic Intentionality.  Jacob and
van Gulick both disagree with Searle's connection principle arguing, first, that function
should come before Intentionality and consciousness in an order of explanation and,
second, that it is possible to have an Intentional state that is not of the sort that could be
conscious.
Jacob believes that there are two problems with Searle's description of the
connection between Intentionality and consciousness.  The first is the implication that
Intentionality is prior to function and the second problem is discussed in section E below. 
Jacob argues that if Intentionality were to precede function this would mean that "the
ascription of biological function is somehow indeterminate, if not observer-dependent".21 
Jacob argues that, if we accept Searle's position, we have to accept that we dont
discover certain biological functions at all, for example, that the hearts function is to
pump blood.  
Searle responds to Jacobs first argument by claiming that all we discover in the
study of biological systems are a lot of facts about these systems that are then interpreted
in order to arrive at the function.  The reason why biological function is discoverable is
that, according to Searle, the interpretation of biological facts takes place within a
framework that is (almost) universally accepted.  Searle argues that 
Harvey did indeed discover that the function of the heart is to pump
blood, but he made that discovery by discovering a whole lot of facts
about the heart and these facts are situated relative to a teleology which
17
22 Searle, Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle, 221.
23A statement is counterfactual supporting if it is not only true of its occurrences but also
 true of its non-occurrences.  Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, 11.
is more or less universally accepted.22
2.4 Millikans account of Intentionality
Jacobs stance here is similar to that of Ruth Millikan, as described in the
introduction.  Millikan claims that in order for something to have Intentionality or content
it must be able to represent an object.  The ability to be represented implies that the
object can be misrepresented.  To misrepresent is to mis-function and in order for
something to mis-function it must have a proper function to begin with.  Therefore,
function precedes Intentionality and function is necessary (but not sufficient) for
Intentionality.  Millikan argues that biological selection is a method of design, and that
this design is the source of function, and this function is the source of Intentionality or
content.  Thus, Intentionality can be reduced to function.
The problems with this approach both have to do with what Fodor calls functional
indeterminacy.  Fodor argues that in interpreting a frog's food-seeking behavior we can
claim either that the frog is snapping at flies or that the frog is snapping at small, dark,
moving objects.  This is because fly and small, dark, moving object are co-extensive
in the frog's environment.  Thus, it is impossible to determine whether the function here is
snap at flies or snap at small, dark, moving objects.  Fodor argues that 
appeals to mechanisms of selection wont decide between reliably
equivalent content ascriptions; i.e., they wont decide between any pair
of equivalent content ascriptions where the equivalence is
counterfactual supporting.23 
18
24Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, 8.
25Millikan, Speaking up for Darwin, 160.
26Millikan, Speaking up for Darwin, 160.
This Fodor calls the disjunction problem and argues that contrary to the many
advertisements you may have seen  the teleological story about [I]ntentionality does not
solve the disjunction problem.24  
Millikan's response to this argument is that the correct function is the function
that the trait was selected for.  Thus the function of a heart is to pump blood and not to
make a thumping noise.  Millikan appeals to Sobers distinction between what is selected
vs. what is selected for.  She claims that what a system selects for depends upon the
causal mechanisms of selection, in particular, upon the properties one has to mention in
giving a causal explanation of how some items got selected in while others were selected
out.25  As an example, she describes a childs toy that sorts balls of different shapes.  It
just happens that all of the balls of a particular size are also the same colour.  So the toy
sorts both the smallest balls as well as all of the balls that are green.  Millikan claims that
in this case it is obvious that the toy is selecting for size while the fact that it also selects
all of the green balls is only contingent.  According to Millikan 
disjunctive properties can enter into the premises of inferences from
knowledge of earlier situations to knowledge of later ones, but this kind
of deductive inference from past situations to future ones often has
nothing to do with causal explanation.  That the frogs ancestors caught
flies-or-bee-bees and there were no bee-bees, is no more part of a
causal explanation for proliferation of frogs, than that I caught the
measles or the flu and I didnt catch the flu is part of the causal
explanation of my red rash.  Hence the frogs fly-catching mechanisms
assuredly are not flee-bee [sic] catchers; that is not one of their
functions.26
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She claims that rabbit thumps signal rabbit dangers, but given how timid rabbits are, the
count on actual correspondences of dangers to thumps is probably quite small.27  Just
because the function of the rabbit thumping fails in many situations doesnt mean that the
function of the rabbit thumping isnt to signal danger.  
Fodor responds to Millikan here by claiming that 
in Sobers example, we know that whats selected for is shape rather
than color because we know that the following counterfactuals are true:
a red ball of the same shape would have gone through; a green ball of a
different shape would not have.  So what makes the difference between
selected and selected for is not history but counterfactuals.28
Fodor argues that Millikan begs the question here.  He argues that you can describe 
the frogs fly detectors signals as caring precisely about whether the
signals correspond to some thing black or ambient or specklike, viz.
they are mechanisms designed to perform certain chemical . . .
processes on ambient black specklike things in a world where the
ambient specklike things are largely food.29
The problem with Millikans argument, according to Fodor, is that she doesnt give a
Darwinian reason for accepting her definition over the alternative.
The other way that functional indeterminacy causes problems for a teleosemantic
account of Intentionality is that traits are often selected for many different reasons (they
serve many different causal roles) so the function of a specific trait is not always obvious. 
For example, the particular colour of a lizard's skin may cause the lizard to be better
camouflaged within its environment and it may also cause the lizard to attract a better
mate.  If the function of a trait determines its content then it must be possible to
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determine which of these outcomes it is the true function of the lizards colour to effect. 
Millikan responds to this argument by claiming that a trait can serve many different
functions.  The example above would show merely that there are some traits that have
multiple functions  not that there are traits with indeterminate function.  The problem
with this is that having numerous but determinate functions still leaves us with
indeterminate content.
Due to the problem of functional indeterminacy, outlined by Fodor, Jacobs claim
that function should precede Intentionality is not a convincing reason to reject Searles
theory.  The only problem with accepting Searles view that Intentionality must precede
function is that we still want to be able to claim that discoveries about function are still
discoveries.  However, Searle attempts to solve this problem by appealing to the use of
an almost universally accepted framework.    
2.5 Inaccessible Intentional States
Jacobs second problem for Searle is that, in Searles account, Intentional states
must in principle be open to consciousness.  Jacob argues that discoveries in cognitive
science have led us to believe that there is a lot of Intentional processing which is not
only unconscious but which is also not of the sort that can become conscious.  Van
Gulick also agrees that it is possible to have an Intentional mental state that is in principle
closed to consciousness.  He expounds on Jacobs point, claiming that "unconscious
mental states play a prominent role in many models of perception, language-processing,
and reasoning, and the relevant states are generally not of a sort to which we could gain
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access".30  
The problem with this argument is that it is difficult to have proof of something
that is in principle closed to our consciousness.  Neither Jacob nor van Gulick explain
what exactly it is about these states that makes them closed to consciousness in principle. 
It seems as though the examples are cases where the state is not conscious to the subject,
but this does not show that the state is in principle closed to the subject.  Van Gulick
claims that these states are not of a sort where it would be possible to gain access but
doesn't describe what characterizes this set or what it is that makes this set inaccessible to
consciousness.  The other problems with this argument is that theories positing a
linguistic module in the brain (which is the main theory I assume Jacob and van Gulick
are referring to) are, though widely accepted, not proven and that, even if they were
proven, there is no reason, so far as I can see, to believe that this type of intrinsic
linguistic rule-following is Intentional according to Searles definition. 
2.6 The Background
One of the things that characterizes Searles definition of Intentionality is that our
Intentional states do not exist in a vacuum.  He claims that each intentional state has its
content and determines its conditions of satisfaction only in relation to numerous other
Intentional states.31  As an internalist, Searle claims that our mental states have the
content that they have due to their connection to our other mental states  this is how
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Searle attempts to solve Putnams underdetermination problem.  The connection that our
mental states have to one another is due to the fact that Intentionality functions within a
Network.  The Network, as defined by Searle, is the position that  
beliefs and desires are only part of a larger complex of other
psychological states; there will be subsidiary Intentions as well as hopes
and fears, anxieties and anticipations, feelings of frustration and
satisfaction.  For short, I have been calling this entire holistic network,
simply, the Network.32  
For example, Searle argues that a contemporary man who thinks "I am going to become
the president of the United States" is different from a caveman having this exact same
thought.  This is because the present-day man has knowledge about democracy, the
United States, and the presidency which the caveman lacks.  This is why the caveman's
thought is unintelligible while the present-day mans thought makes perfect sense.  All of
this knowledge about the world which enables the present-day man's thought to be
intelligible is part of the Network. That our Intentional states have this sort of connection
to one another is not nearly as contentious as Searles claim that it is these connections
that determines what the content is of a particular mental state.  
The most controversial element of Searles discussion of the Network however is
his introduction of the Background which consists of pre-Intentional mental states.  The
hypothesis of the Background is the claim that Intentional states are underlain by
nonrepresentational, preintentional capacities.33  This Background, according to Searle,
is "a set of non-representational mental capacities that enable all representing to take
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 appears to be using the term assumption in a somewhat metaphorical way.  What he
 means by assumption is that the Network is taken for granted, rather than that there is a
place".34  These are the things that it is necessary that we know in order for our
Intentional content to make sense but that are not actually part of that Intentional
content. According to Searle the Background provides necessary but not sufficient
conditions for understanding, believing, desiring, intending, etc., and in that sense it is
enabling and not determining.35  For example, in order for me to do something as simple
as walking across a room I require the non-Intentional assumptions that the ground is
solid, that I wont float away into the air, as well as numerous assumptions about how
to move my body etc.
  Searles explanation of the theory of the Background begins with him asking the
reader to try to imagine the fundamental state that is at the core of a particular Intentional
state.  Searle argues that discovery of this fundamental state is impossible because we
always have underlying assumptions about every Intentional state that leads us back to
another.  He argues that a reason why discovery of a fundamental state is impossible may
be because most of the Network is submerged in the unconscious and we dont quite
know how to dredge it up.36  Another problem, according to Searle, could be that the
states in the Network do not individuate; we dont know, for example, how to count
beliefs.37  Searle claims that at the core of our Intentional states are pre-intentional
assumptions about the world.38  We cant discover our primary beliefs because they are
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 supposition involved.  I will be using the term expectation rather than assumption in
 my discussion here since expectation doesnt imply Intentional content in the same
 way that assumption does. 
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in a sense too fundamental to qualify as beliefs, even as unconscious beliefs.39  Searle
argues that  
anyone who tries seriously to follow out the threads in the Network
will eventually reach a bedrock of mental capacities that do not
themselves consist in Intentional states (representations), but
nonetheless form the preconditions for the functioning of Intentional
states.  The Background is preintentional in the sense that though not
a form or forms of Intentionality, it is nonetheless a precondition or set
of preconditions of Intentionality.40  
As an example, Searle claims that a great many Intentional states and actions rely
upon the idea that a table is solid.  Searle claims that, while the expectation of the solidity
of tables is certainly a candidate for an Intentional state, it normally isnt.  Human beings
behave in ways that presuppose the solidity of objects around them without having
anything that could properly be called a belief because such expectations lack the
complicated logical structure of beliefs.  These expectations are still mental, however,
since they have, at least what appear to be, conditions of satisfaction.  In fact, is it often
only when these conditions fail to be met that we notice these background expectations at
all.  
Searle complicates the issue further by distinguishing between 
the deep-Background, which would include at least all of those
background capacities that are common to all normal human beings in
virtue of their biological makeup  capacities such as walking, eating,
grasping, perceiving, recognizing, and the preintentional stance that
takes account of the solidity of things, and the independent existence of
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objects and other people  from what we might call the local
Background or local cultural practices, which would include such
things as opening doors, drinking beer from bottles, and the
preintentional stance that we take toward such things as cars,
refrigerators, money and cocktail parties.41
Searle claims that without the Background no representation is possible.  This is
because the explanation of a representational state must rely upon a non-representational
state in order to halt regress.  Searle claims that if representation presupposes a
Background, then the Background cannot itself consist in representations without
generating an infinite regress.42  Searle argues that 
Intentional states only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do,
and thus only are the states that they are, against a Background of
abilities that are not themselves Intentional states.  In order that I can
now have the Intentional states that I do I must have certain kinds of
know-how: I must know how things are and I must know how to do
things, but the kinds of know-how in question are not, in these cases
forms of knowing-that.43
  
Searle admits however that there is no sharp dividing line between cases of know-how
and cases of know-that, which seems to imply that there is likewise no sharp dividing line
between what would count as the Network and what would count as the Background. 
This is a fairly intuitive assumption since, as Searle points out earlier, states that belong
to the Background can become Intentional (basically by being noticed).
Searle believes that one reason to assume that there is a background of
dispositional states is that we can turn know-that into know-how where we have
internalized the rules for performing certain actions.  He appeals to a description of
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athletic knowledge as an example of a rule being internalized to the point where it
becomes preintentional.  Searle argues that 
as the skier gets better he does not internalize the rules better, but
rather the rules become progressively irrelevant.  The rules do not
become wired in as unconscious Intentional contents, but the repeated
experiences create physical capacities, presumably realized as neural
pathways, that make the rules simply irrelevant.44  
This idea relies upon the folk-psychological concept of body knowledge.  Many
athletes claim that the moment that they became good at a particular sport was the
moment that they stopped thinking about what they were doing and just let their body
guide them.  A less complex example might be something like touching a hot stove.  It
appears as though we pull our hand away from the stove even before we realize that we
are touching something hot.  
However, this example serves to illuminate the flaw in Searles argument.  In the
case of touching the hot stove the biological explanation for us pulling away before
mentally processing the information is that our nervous system has certain responses that
dont rely upon mental processing at all.  It is possible that by internalizing rules an
athlete hasnt actually begun to have preintentional mental states but rather that their
reactions no longer rely upon mental states at all.  This is evidenced by the fact that the
response times of athletes are occasionally happening too quickly for a message to be
sent up to their brain and then back to the body part(s) that need to be manipulated. 
2.7 Solution to the Underdetermination Problem
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Searles main argument for the Background is that without these pre-Intentional
assumptions interpretation of language is underdetermined.  Searle argues that it is only
by positing the Background that we can account for the fact that people properly (most
of the time) interpret sentences such as the cat is on the mat.  He argues that this is
evidenced by the fact that imagining a change in these background assumptions will leave
us with different conditions of satisfaction and a different truth value for the sentence. 
Searle argues that 
this has the consequence that the notion of the literal meaning of a
sentence is not a context free notion; it only has application relative to a
set of preintentional Background assumptions and practices.45  
As an example Searle uses the many different interpretations that we can have for the
literal translation of the word open depending upon which context the word is used
in.46  
Just as the interpretation of the literal meaning of sentences creates problems
unless one presupposes a Background, so the metaphorical interpretation of sentences
creates even more problems.  Firstly, it is difficult to determine what it is that causes
people to assume that a sentence is intended to be taken metaphorically.  Searle claims
that there is no algorithm for discovering when an utterance is intended
metaphorically.47  It also seems impossible to determine exactly why it is that people
understand certain metaphors.  Searle claims that metaphorical utterances can be
28
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
50Ibid.
51Searle, Intentionality, 149.
interpreted as X is like Y with regard to certain features F but what those features are
exactly cannot be determined algorithmically either.  Searle claims that there are many
metaphors whose interpretation does not rely on any perception of literal similarity
between the extension of the Y term and the referent of the X term.48  As an example
Searle appeals to metaphors about taste and temperature.  We claim that some people
have a bitter disposition or a hot temper, 
but in neither case of the taste metaphors nor the case of the
temperature metaphors are there any literal similarities between the
extension of the Y term and the referent of the X term which are
sufficient to account for the metaphorical utterance meaning.49
  
Searle argues that 
the nonalgorithmic character of the rules and the fact that some of the
associations are not determined by rules at all suggest that there are
nonrepresentational capacities involved, but that claim would be
misleading if it is taken to imply that a complete and algorithmic set of
rules for metaphor would show that there is no such Background; for
even such rules would require a Background for their application as we
shall see.50  
He claims that it just seems to be a fact about our mental capacities that we are able to
interpret certain sorts of metaphor without the application of any underlying rules or
principles other than the sheer ability to make certain associations.51  
Searle gets us to imagine that we could write down all of our beliefs and
principles or inferences that lead to the development of further beliefs on a piece of paper
as axioms.  It seems as though, depending upon the Background expectations that are
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already in place, these axioms can be interpreted in numerous different ways.  Searle
argues that 
about this list I want to say, if all we have is a verbal expression of the
content of your beliefs, then so far we have no Intentionality at all. 
And this is not because what you have written down are lifeless
marks, without significance, but because even if we construe them as
expressing Fregean semantic entities, i.e., as propositional contents, the
propositions are not self-applying.  You still have to know what to do
with the semantic elements before they can function; you have to be
able to apply the semantic contents in order that they determine
conditions of satisfaction.  Now it is this capacity for applying or
interpreting Intentional contents which I am saying is a characteristic
function of the Background.52  
Searle takes this to show that 
we do have Intentional states, some conscious, many unconscious; they
form a complex Network.  The Network shades off into a Background
of capacities (including various skills, abilities, preintentional
assumptions and presuppositions, stances, and nonrepresentational
attitudes).  The Background is not on the periphery of Intentionality but
permeates the entire Network of Intentional states; since without the
Background the states could not function, they could not determine
conditions of satisfaction.53
Searles description of Intentionality up to this point was that the necessary and
sufficient conditions for Intentionality are that a state has conditions of satisfaction,
aboutness, and that this aboutness is of something other than the state itself.  The
Background is potentially conscious, according to Searle, since it has conditions of
satisfaction that become obvious only when they do not obtain (you would be very
surprised one day if you went to place your coffee mug on your desk and it was no
longer solid); however, the Background is not Intentional since it lacks the logical
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structure of Intentional states.  The thesis that Intentionality can be explained by a
discussion of logical structure results in one immediate difficulty.  Obviously the
Intentionality that is seen in language is not a problem since Searle can claim that this
form of Intentionality is derived from the Intentionality of mental states.  The problem is
that not only complex mental states and linguistic components, but basic perceptions
appear to have Intentionality as well.  Rather than argue that perceptions do not have
Intentionality Searle attempts to solve this problem by arguing instead that perceptions
have Intentional content.
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Chapter Three  The Intentionality of Perception
In customary Searlean manner the chapter on the Intentionality of perception
begins with a rejection of how the problem of perception has been looked at in the past. 
Searle claims that the inner/outer metaphor used for perception is inherently flawed since
our minds are as much a part of the external world as anything else is.  He also claims
that we need to reject the notion that our perceptions have mental objects since this leads
to there being double the objects for every perception.  Thus the question how do our
internal perceptions relate to the external world? needs to be reformulated.  Searle
appears to be splitting hairs here since he doesnt actually attempt to reformulate this
question and actually, for all intents and purposes, answers the very question that he
claims to reject.  Searles actual intention here appears to be informing the reader of the
fact that he is going to propose a naïve realist view of perception and that this view will
deviate somewhat from the theories proposed by other philosophers.  
It becomes obvious that the latter is the case when Searle goes on to claim that
perceptions have conditions of satisfaction and propositional content.  The truly
controversial aspect of Searles theory of perception, however, is his claim that this
propositional content is Intentional in the very same way that beliefs and desires are and
that perceptions are self-referential in nature.  I will be examining the first of these claims
about which Dretske claims it is amazing what impeccable logic and a false premise can
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make you say.54  I will also be looking at Dretskes replies to Searle; his claims that the
causal theory of perception does not need to appeal to Intentionality in order to solve the
particularity problem, that cases of mistaken perception undermine the claim that
perceptions have conditions of satisfaction, and that perceptions do not represent the
world in the same way that sentences do.
3.1 Searles Account of Perception
Searles major claim in Chapter Two of Intentionality, The Intentionality of
Perception, is that the visual experience is as much directed at or of objects and states
of affairs in the world as any of the paradigm Intentional states.55  He claims that this is
evidenced by the fact that perceptions have conditions of satisfaction and representational
content just as beliefs and desires do.  Searle defines conditions of satisfaction by
claiming that conditions of satisfaction are those conditions which, as determined by the
Intentional content, must obtain if the state is to be satisfied.56  According to Searle
when we have a perception it is not the case, strictly speaking, that it is true or false but
merely that it is satisfied in that it is an accurate representation of the world.  Perceptions
are different from beliefs and desires because they have a world-to-mind direction of fit
(meaning that the mind is responsible if it is a mistaken perception) whereas beliefs and
desires have a mind-to-world direction of fit (meaning that it is the responsibility of the
mind to achieve the conditions of satisfaction).  
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Searle claims it is obvious that perceptions have conditions of satisfaction because
of the fact that we speak of perceptions as being illusory or incorrect.  When we have a
perception of a station wagon that perception has the condition of satisfaction that there
is a station wagon there and that this station wagon is causing the experience.  Searle
argues that, just as one cannot separate a belief from what it is a belief about, one can
also not separate a perception from what it is a perception of.  The conditions of
satisfaction are part of the perception itself since the perception tells us what needs to be
the case in order for the experience to be veridical.  This means that, according to Searle,
perceptions have representational content (Searle uses the term presentational) in the
same way that beliefs and desires do.
If Searle is correct here then the content of our perceptions is always a
proposition, i.e. all seeing is seeing that.57  He argues that visual experience is never
simply of an object but rather it must always be that such and such is the case.  Thus, if
the content of my perception is I am having a visual perception of a yellow station
wagon it is part of this very content that my perception is satisfied only if there actually
is a yellow station wagon in front of me and if this yellow station wagon is causing this
very perception.  Therefore, it is part of the content of the perception that it is of a
specific object.  This of is Intentional since the perceptual experience of a yellow
station wagon is not itself a yellow station wagon as the perception of anxiety is itself the
anxiety.  
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3.2 Seeing vs. Seeing That
Searle argues for the Intentionality of perception by pointing out the differences
between the idioms seeing and seeing that.  One difference being that the see x
form does not commit the reporter to reporting how it seemed to the agent, but the see
that form does.58  So, in the case of a mistaken perception, it is correct to say that Jane
saw a yellow station wagon even though she thought that she was seeing a Cadillac, but
it does not make any sense to say that Jane saw that there was a yellow station wagon
but she thought that she was seeing a Cadillac.  According to Searle, since all seeing is
seeing that, then the content of our Intentional state is a proposition.  Searle argues
that it is the very nature of perception itself that we assume that the conditions of
satisfaction obtain, thus, the conditions of satisfaction are built in to every one of our
perceptions.  Therefore, perceptions are always self-referential in the sense that it figures
in its own conditions of satisfaction.59  Searle claims that 
the Intentional content of the visual experience, which requires that
there be a yellow station wagon in front of me in order that it be
satisfied, also requires the fact that there is a yellow station wagon in
front of me must be the cause of that very visual experience.60  
So the content of our perceptions becomes I have a visual experience (that there is a
yellow station wagon there and that there is a yellow station wagon there is causing this
visual experience).61  Thus Searle has amended the causal theory of perception and
created the theory of Intentional causation.  This self-reference means that part of the
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content of the Intentional state is that it be caused by the actual object and this means that
there is a causal relation as part of the content of the Intentional state.  
Searle claims that the difference between the causal theory of perception and the
theory of Intentional causation is that the latter recognizes that Intentionality is built into
perception in the sense that "it could not be this very visual experience if it was not an
experience whose Intentionality was that it is a case of seeming to see this thing in front
of me.62  The reason why my perception of a computer screen in front of me is
intrinsically Intentional is that it is a condition of my having this visual experience that I
refer to the computer screen in front of me.  Searle claims that the Intentionality of vision
cannot be a case of derived Intentionality since the seeming to see is not added on to the
visual experience in a way that the referential relation to a particular man is added on to
the word Clinton.63  He claims that visual experience is never simply of an object but
rather it must always be that such and such is the case.64 
Searle argues that Intentionality in the case of vision can be extended to show that
all cases of perception are Intentional and, in fact, even actions are intrinsically
Intentional.  Searle gives an example of a man who is anesthetized and is trying to raise
his arm which is, unbeknownst to him, tied down to the bed.  When the man opens his
eyes he is surprised to discover that his arm has not been raised.  Searle claims that this is
just like the cases of visual hallucination where the subject has an experience but the
conditions of satisfaction of the Intentional state fail to obtain.  Searle also gives an
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example of patients who are caused to raise their arm by the application of an electrode
to their motor cortex.  According to Penfield the responses of the patients is I didn't do
that.  You did.  
Searle argues that the difference between these two cases is a phenomenal one. 
He claims that the two cases feel different to the patient; and secondly that this
phenomenal difference carries with it a logical difference in the sense that the experience
of moving one's hand has certain conditions of satisfaction.  Such concepts as trying,
succeeding, and failing apply to it in ways that they do not apply to the experiences
the patient has when he simply observes his hand moving.65  So this phenomenal quality
of action is what is Intentional and can be analogized to the visual experience.  Action is
also similar to perception in that the latter has as conditions of satisfaction that there are
certain states of affairs or objects in the world and that these objects or states of affairs
are what is causing the perception, and the former has as conditions of satisfaction that
there are certain bodily movements or states and that it is the agent's intentions that are
causing these bodily movements or states.  Action differs from perception in that the
former has a world-to-mind direction of fit and a mind-to-world direction of causation
and the latter has a mind-to-world direction of fit and a world-to-mind direction of
causation.
3.3 Dretskes Arguments
Dretske agrees with Searle that in order to perceive something we must have a
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conscious experience of it but claims that one reason [this] isnt enough is that the way x
causes an experience in us may be so unusual or deviant that we refuse to count it as a
perception of x.66  He uses the example of someone who perceives a yellow station
wagon by having a particular smell.  According to Dretske, even if this olfactory
experience were caused by the station wagon, many of us would not be inclined to say
that the person was actually having a perception of the station wagon.  In agreement with
Searle, Dretske claims that it is not enough that x causes a perception in us but that this
perception is of the very object x.  Dretskes disagreements with Searle begin when
Searle claims that perceptual states represent objects in the same way that sentences do. 
Dretske claims that it is by no means obvious that if an experience is of a yellow station
wagon then it must represent the yellow station wagon in the way a statement . . . about
the car represents it.67  
Dretske attempts to prove this point by analogizing perception to a photograph
instead of a sentence.  He claims that the photograph is not "of" something in virtue of
what we take it to be but in virtue of the causal chain involved in creating it.  He argues
that what makes it a picture of a yellow station wagon . . . is simply the fact that it is my
(not your) car that is at the other end of an appropriate causal chain.68  In fact, he
argues, a photograph can look very unlike what it is actually a picture of.  That the
photograph appears to be a house when it is in fact of a facade gives us reason to believe
that those taking it to be a house are mistaken.  Dretske argues that there is no reason for
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us to assume that perceptions represent reality in the same way that sentences do rather
than as photographs do.  It is plausible, Dretske argues, (far more plausible than Searles
account) that a perception is of a particular object purely in virtue of a causal connection
between the perceiver and the object.  Dretske claims that we call visual experiences
illusory, not because they have representational content, but that the only sense in which
experiences are false or misleading is the sense in which thermometer readings can be
false or misleading; they can produce false beliefs in those who depend on them for
information.69
Dretske also believes that cases of mistaken perceptions create a problem for
Searles account.  He uses the example of a yellow station wagon that is so far away that
it appears to be a speck on our windshield at first and asks 
when one first saw the yellow station wagon, at the time when it looked
like (and you thought that it might actually be) a speck on the
windshield, did ones experience of it represent it as a yellow station
wagon?70  
He answers his own question, arguing that there need be nothing in or about an
experience of x that reveals what it is an experience of.71  
This argument strikes to the heart of our intuitions about perceptions; however, it
is flawed in that it is caused by a misunderstanding of Searles position.  Searle never
claims that the conditions of satisfaction of a perception are always satisfied, in fact, he
acknowledges the fact that we can have mistaken perceptions.  In the case of mistaken
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perceptions, that the yellow speck on our windshield is a yellow station wagon is not part
of the content because the conditions of satisfaction are not that there is a yellow station
wagon there (since that is not what we take ourselves to be seeing) but rather that there
is a yellow speck on our windshield.  As the yellow station wagon comes closer our
perception now has the conditions of satisfaction that there is a yellow station wagon
there and we realize that our former perception was mistaken.  It is not the case that our
perceptions have as their content what the object is that is causing them; rather, our
perceptions have as their content what we take ourselves to perceive.  Searles argument
is that when we have a perceptual experience it is always an experience of something,
not that we are always correct about what our experience is of.  Dretskes argument
about the yellow speck in fact supports this argument since it shows that we cannot have
a perception without making assumptions about what it is we perceive.  Even if
something is moving past us too quickly to discern, if we are truly perceiving it, then we
perceive it as that fast moving yellow thing etc.  Searle argues that I no more infer that
the car is the cause of my visual experience than I infer that it is yellow.72  
Dretske further argues that Searle's proposal that perceptions are Intentional
suffers from logical flaws.  Dretske claims that perceptual experiences dont embody
propositional attitudes at all and that the belief that they do is caused by mistaking 
an x that is F (an object that is a yellow station wagon) with seeing x as
F (which, at least on one reading, is a propositional attitude  viz.
taking x to be F) or seeing that x is F (which, on any reading is a
propositional attitude  viz. knowing, hence believing that x is F).73  
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Dretske believes that we can have a visual experience of a station wagon without
recognizing what it is that we are having an experience of; we can see a yellow station
wagon without seeing that the thing in front of us is a station wagon.  He argues that the
fact that one can be mistaken about whether x is an F or not means that our perceptions
cannot have propositional content because our perception can only be a representation
after we have identified a particular object.  
This argument is flawed because it is just as possible to have mistaken
propositional content as it is to have mistaken cases of perception and because it does
seem as though our cases of perceiving do involve the underlying assumptions that Searle
claims that they do.  Namely, we assume that there is an object of our perception and that
this object is causing our perception.  There are certain situations where it would make
sense to say that I am perceiving X but I don't believe that there is actually an X there;
however, these cases are far from what is usual.  In fact, the only time when this sort of
description would make sense seems to involve a failure of perception that is known to
the observer, e.g., hallucinations.
3.4 The Particularity Problem
The most compelling reason to accept Searle's Intentional causation account of
perception over Dretske's causal account is that Searle's account solves the problem of
particularity or how it is that our perceptions are of particular objects.  Searle
formulates this problem as: 
what is it about Joness visual experience right here on our earth that
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makes it the case that it can only be satisfied by one particular
previously identified woman and not by some other woman who
happened to be type identical with that woman, whether Jones can tell
the difference or not?74  
Searle claims that an appeal to Intentionality is needed because the causal theory does not
solve this problem.  He argues that the causal theory fails to answer the question as to
how this fact [that Jones takes himself to be seeing a particular previously identified
woman] gets into the Intentional content.75  In other words, the causal theory only
solves the particularity problem from a third-person perspective whereas, according to
Searle, it needs to be solved from a first person point of view.  Therefore the question . .
. is not under what conditions does he in fact see Sally whether he knows it or not?, but
under what conditions does he take himself to be seeing that Sally is in front of him?.76 
One of the problems for the causal theory is that when Jones takes Sally to be Jane there
is a sense in which his perception is referring to Jane even though the cause of his
perception is Sally.  It is this that the causal theory cannot account for.  
Searle attempts to solve the particularity problem by appealing to a discussion of
the Network and the Background.  It is the indexicality of the Network and the
Background, i.e., the characteristic of the Network and the Background that allows us to
baptize a particular object of perception as that one, which solves the problem of
particularity.  Searle claims that 
the conditions of satisfaction of each experience and each memory after
the initial encounter with Sally are not just that the experience should
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be satisfied by a woman satisfying Sallys description in general terms
but that it should be caused by the same woman who caused Joness
other experiences and memories.77  
Searle claims this is proven by that fact that if it were discovered that Sally and Jane had
been switched at birth and that Sally has really been Jane all along, then Joness
perception is still satisfied, but if she has been switched just before the perception in
question and replaced with her twin then the perception is not satisfied.  
One potential problem brought up by Kent Bach in Searle Against the World:
How Can Experiences Find Their Objects? is that Searle has really not solved the
problem of particularity here; he has only solved the problem for cases of
re-identification.  The appeal to the Network and Background does solve the particularity
problem for cases of re-identification only, but the appeal to Intentional causation I
believe does solve the particularity problem for other cases, e.g., the reason Jones takes
himself to perceive Sally and not someone qualitatively identical to her (even on the first
meeting) is because, on Searles naïve realist view, Joness perception has the actual Sally
built into its conditions of satisfaction.  
Another problem with Searles account so far are cases like the Sally/Jane case. 
For example, suppose that throughout his ten years of knowing Sally, every second time
that he thought he met her it was in fact her twin Jane.  When Jones has a perception of
Sally, is it satisfied only every second time that he takes himself to be meeting her, even
though at this point a reference to Jane is taking place as well?  When Jones has a
perception of someone who he takes to be Sally, is he really referring to two women or is
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he referring only to the first Sally that he met?  Searle could probably solve this
problem by claiming that Joness Network of Intentional states indicate both women so
that when he refers to Sally he is referring to the united Sally and Jane or the disjunctive
Sally or Jane. Dretske claims that the causal theory of perception solves the particularity
problem and that an appeal to Intentionality is not necessary.  Dretske argues that the
concerns with the causal theory that Searle brought up (that it only solves the problem of
particularity in a third-person way) is not a concern for the causal theory of perception
but that it is merely Searle's own problem.  Searle's response to this is that Dretske's
alleged solution fails to answer the question as to how this fact gets into the Intentional
content,78 the fact being that the experience is caused by the very person and not
someone that looks exactly like her.  Searle argues that 
the conditions of satisfaction of each experience and each memory after
the initial encounter with Sally are not just that the experience should
be satisfied by a woman satisfying Sallys description in general terms
but that it should be caused by the same woman who caused Joness
other experiences and memories.79  
In Perception and Reference without Causality80  Jaegwon Kim points out some
problems with the causal theorys attempt to solve the particularity problem that
undermine Dretske's claim that Intentionality is not needed.  Kim claims that the problem
with the causal theory of perception is that there are many factors concerning the
perception of a given object.  For example, is it really the tree causing my perception of a
tree, or is it light waves, or is it the gardener who planted the tree?  If we accept the
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representationalist view of the mind and of our Intentional states being similar to the
object that they are about, then our visual experience can be said to be of the tree. 
Kims argument is that resemblance and causal connection even together may not be
enough to assume that our visual experiences are of a particular object.  
He claims that a causal connection does not solve the problem of fortuitous
satisfaction, e.g., we have a visual experience which is more like the parent tree than it is
of the tree in front of us and the parent tree obviously was causally responsible for our
perception  yet, clearly, we are not having a perception of the parent tree.  
Therefore, the main benefit of the theory of Intentional perception (that it solves
the problem of particularity) does appear to be a reason to accept this theory over the
causal account of perception.  Furthermore, as shown above, the arguments that Dretske
poses against the theory that perceptions have Intentional content are all based upon a
misunderstanding of Searles theory.  It is not necessary for our perceptions to always be
correct in order for those perceptions to have the object causing them as part of the
Intentional content.  All that is necessary is that when we take ourselves to be seeing a
particular object this seeing is always seeing that.  
45
81Thompson, Intentionality and Causality in John Searle.
Chapter Four  Intentional Causation
By showing that our perceptions are Intentional Searle has taken the first step
toward naturalizing Intentionality.  Searle completes this process through his theory of
Intentional causation, which logically connects Intentionality to natural objects.  He uses
this connection in order to disprove the transcendentalists thesis that Intentionality is
something above and beyond the natural world.  An important argument for the theory of
Intentional causation is Searles claim that a characteristic of the content of our
Intentional states is that they are caused by the objects outlined in the conditions of
satisfaction.  One possible problem with this theory, brought up by David Thompson, is
that the content of the Intentional state determines the conditions of satisfaction and this
means that the "actual cause" of the Intentional state, at least in some cases, must be the
same as the "cause as requirement", i.e., we have to assume that what we take ourselves
to be seeing, at least in some cases, is what we are actually seeing.81  This criticism is very
similar to Dretskes criticism of Searles theory of perception seen in the previous
chapter, and Thompson also appeals to cases of mistaken perception in order to prove his
point.  Thompson argues that Searles theory is incorrect since we never know that the
actual cause and the cause as requirement are truly the same.  Thompson also claims that
even if Searle is correct about causation being able to link Intentionality to natural
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objects, he has to put forth an entirely new sense of causation in order to do so.  He
argues that Searle's theory of Intentional causation is less clear about what causation
actually is than the standard regularity theory was and, therefore, is not a reasonable
substitute for it.  Searle, however, is not proposing an alternative to the standard
regularity account of causation; he is merely offering an amendment to that theory.  The
theory of Intentional causation is not intended to take the place of the standard regularity
theory; it is intended as a sort of postscript to that theory which accounts for a different
sense of the term causation.  Thompsons claims will be examined in greater detail
throughout this chapter.
4.1 Description of Intentional Causation
It is the self-referential quality of conditions of satisfaction that leads to Searles
development of the theory of Intentional causation.  This self-reference means that part of
the content of the Intentional state is that it be caused by the actual object and this means
that there is a causal relation as part of the content of the Intentional state.  It is this
connection between causation and Intentionality which Searle calls Intentional causation. 
Searle claims that Intentional causation is merely a subset of regular causation but differs
from the standard regularity theory in three ways.  That is, he believes that we can
directly observe the relation of causation between events (and that we do observe this
relation all of the time), he believes that causation is not based upon universal regularities
or laws but that it is an actual relation in the world, and he believes that natural objects
are logically related to the Intentional content.
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Searle attempts to show why his theory of Intentional causation is necessary by
describing uses of the term causation which are not compatible with the regularity
account.  His first example is of when someone takes a drink of water and claims that the
cause of their drinking was thirst.  Searle explains that when this person says that they
took a drink of water because they were thirsty this claim does not rely upon further
observation in order to show that it is true.  It would be foolish to ask the person how
do you know that you took the drink of water because you were thirsty? because this
knowledge is immediate.  Searle also claims that we know the counterfactual without
further observation as well, i.e., this person knows that if they were not thirsty then they
would not have taken a drink of water, without having to appeal to anything outside of
themselves in order to justify this.  
Searle also uses the thirst example to show that causal descriptions do not
necessarily invoke universal regularities or laws.  According to Searle, when we claim
that we took a drink because of our thirst, this claim does not entail any causal laws or
regularities.  Even though the speaker may admit that there could be some laws relating
their drinking to their thirst the statement my thirst caused my drinking does not entail
a statement like there is some law L such that there is some description ψ of my thirst
and some description λ of my drinking, and L asserts a universal correlation of events of
type ψ and events of type λ.82  Searle claims that the only justification for describing
causation in terms of regularities would be if cause did not name a relation in the actual
48
world.  Since Searle is a realist about causation then, according to him, he doesn't need to
rely upon regularities as explanations.
4.2 Thompsons argument 
Thompson finds fault with the thirst example for a couple of reasons, one of
which is that Searle never discusses the distinction between reasons and causes. 
Thompson claims that if thirst were just a reason for drinking and not a cause of it, then
Searles claim that there are some accounts of causation which are not explained within
the regularity account of causation is incorrect.  This is because the thirst example would
only be showing that there are some cases where people use the term cause incorrectly. 
Thompson also claims that even if we grant that thirst is a cause of someone drinking it is
certainly not a sufficient cause because there are more things which are connected to our
taking a drink then merely thirst.  
In the situation outlined above, and in other situations like it, when we claim that
our thirst caused us to drink we do mean that it was a cause and not just a reason. 
Perhaps we would agree that it is not a sufficient cause, because most people would
agree that there are other causes involved as well, but we are still using the term here to
mean cause and nothing else.  Thompson claims that in the scientific use of the word
cause, regularity is implied, thus the other uses of cause are merely incorrect.  Here
Thompson seems actually to be agreeing with Searle, he agrees that our regular, everyday
use of the word cause deviates from the scientific use of the term which the regularity
account describes.  Searle's point is that there are some cases of causation that are not
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taken account of in the regularity account.  If we take all of our uses of the word cause
to be cases of causation then Searle is correct, even according to Thompson.  Calling all
uses of the term cause which differ from the scientific or regularity account incorrect
would mean that a lot, if not most of the time, our use of the word is wrong.  We still
need to explain what is meant when we use the term in these ways.  The only real
difference between Searle's position and that of Thompson seems to be that Thompson is
satisfied in ignoring all uses of cause which are not scientific while Searle believes that
we need to account for these common-place uses in our theory of causation.
4.3 Logical Connection between Objects and Intentional Content
Searles last deviation from the standard theory of causation is not shown in the
thirst example but is part of the structure of Intentional causation itself.  He claims that
there is a logical or internal connection between natural objects and Intentional contents. 
This is the part of Searles theory that defeats the transcendentalists thesis and,
therefore, naturalizes Intentionality because this difference is the one that connects
natural objects and Intentional states.  Searle claims that the connection between
Intentional states and their objects is something beyond mere descriptions of causes and
descriptions of effects.  The Intentional content is causally related to actual objects
through the conditions of satisfaction.  This is because part of the conditions of
satisfaction of the Intentional content is that the Intentional state be caused by the actual
object.  So, if you have the Intentional state of perceiving a cup of tea, that state is
logically connected to the cup of tea in the world, because you have as conditions of
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satisfaction that there is a cup of tea there and that the cup of tea is causing your
perception, and these conditions are built right into your Intentional state.
One of Thompsons objections so far is that Searles position seems to be
dangerously similar to a priori causation, a position which Searle explicitly rejects.  This
is because causation is now a logical feature of perception and action, as opposed to
being discovered empirically.  In Searles view, however, it is through perception that we
recognize causation, not prior to perception.  Searle claims that we dont need an a priori
sense of causation in order to experience it any more than we have to have an a priori
concept of red to experience redness.83  Our perceptions, Intentionality, and sense of
causation all evolve together according to Searle.  
Searle's amendment to the standard regularity account of causation is based upon
two things: He claims, first, that the standard regularity account fails to acknowledge the
Intentionality of perception and action and, secondly, that it doesnt account for the fact
that conditions of satisfaction are determined by the experience.84  Searle does reject the
notion of an a priori sense of causation, but his amendment to the standard regularity
account is not based upon this rejection.  Also, Thompson is incorrect in assuming that
Searle is positing an a priori sense of causation merely by linking causation to perception
and Intentionality.  
4.4 Actual Cause vs. Cause as Requirement
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The other problem with Searles theory of Intentional causation, Thompson
claims, is that in Searles theory there is no connection between the actual cause and
the cause as requirement.  Thompson argues, we have mistaken cases of perception all
of the time; we can hallucinate or just be completely wrong about what we are seeing. 
Thompson claims that since we can never be sure that our perceptions are being caused
by what we think they are, then there is no logical connection between our Intentional
state and the natural world.  This is because the Intentional content cannot determine the
object referred to if there is no object there at all.  Searle claims, however, that we only
have a real case of perception when the actual cause and the cause as requirement are
the same. In cases of actual perception we can always be sure that there is a logical
connection between our Intentional state and the actual object.  One problem with this,
according to Thompson, is that we cannot ever be certain that we have any cases of
actual perception at all.  As I said before, due to Searles direct realism, he doesnt
consider this to be a coherent concern at all.  The far more serious concern with the lack
of connection between actual cause and cause as requirement is a purely epistemic one. 
Even if we do not doubt that we do have cases of actual perception it is obvious that not
all cases of perception are actual.  The problem with Searles theory is that it doesnt
allow us to distinguish between cases of actual perception and cases of mistaken
perception since that the conditions of satisfaction obtain is built into every perception.  
Searle does address this concern briefly by claiming that there is a phenomenal
difference between cases of mistaken vs. actual perception.  The fact that schizophrenic
patients often claim that they can tell the difference between hallucinations and real
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perceptions would help to justify this view.  However, this wouldnt help to account for
run of the mill cases of mistaken perception in which we are seeing what is actually
there but are misinterpreting it due to a deficiency of information.  Searle could address
this concern by claiming that we discover mistaken perceptions only when they fail us in
some way.  In most normal cases of perception it truly is the case that we have no ability
to tell the difference between an actual perception and a mistaken one.  In these cases the
ability to tell that what we are seeing is not real relies upon that particular perceptions
failure to fit into the Network of our other Intentional states.  If a pink elephant came
barreling into my office right now I would assume that such a perception is false, based
upon certain other Intentional states in my Network  namely, that pink elephants dont
exist, that there are no elephants in the university, etc.  For other cases of mistaken
perception we discover our error by getting more information  either the object moves
closer, the lighting is increased, or we ask someone with better eyesight what they are
seeing.     
4.5 Billiard Ball Causation
Thompson claims that another problem with Searles account is that it is
incompatible with the idea of billiard ball causation.  Searle, however, does explain how
his sense of causation is compatible with causation among billiard balls or other material
objects.  Searles causation is described by him as a sense of making something happen
which may seem to limit this form of causation to human agents, but Searle claims that
we can discover causation in the external world because of the similarities between our
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personally causing things and causal relations that do not involve us as agents.  Searle
attempts to explain how we can be justified in believing that things other than personal
experiences can still be causes by giving an example of how a child could come to
discover causation.  
Searle claims that manipulation is closely connected to causation, and in this
sense, agrees with the standard regularity theory.  He claims that a child discovers the
relation of causation through manipulation of objects.  When a child uses a hard object to
smash a vase she learns that manipulation can be used in order to cause changes in the
environment.  Every step beyond the hard object leaving the child's hand is causal.  When
the child perceives that a hard object falling onto the vase has the same effect as when
they intentionally throw the object this allows them to discover causation beyond human
agents.  
The child is actually discovering causation according to Searle; she is not merely
projecting her sense of Intentional causation onto the world.  Searle claims that this is
because the relation between the objects when the child smashes the vase and when
something unintentionally falls onto the vase are exactly the same.  Searle agrees that
these two cases of causation are not observable in exactly the same way but he claims
that we still see causal relations outside of ourselves as causation and not merely as one
event followed by another event.  So Searles account of causation can be extended to
account for cases of causation that do not involve human agents.  
Our ability to discover causation outside of ourselves is dependent on the notion
of regularity.  While Searle claims that causation does not rely upon regularities he does
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admit that these two concepts are closely connected.  He states that "neither statements
asserting the existence of causation nor the existence of instances of causation entails that
there are general causal laws".85  Causal laws do exist however, and we need a
background assumption of regularity in the world in order to recognize individual
instances of causation.  To explain this reliance upon regularity Searle provides an
example of someone sitting in a hospital bed who discovers that every time they move
their arm up the window beside them opens.  This person is going to start to wonder
whether the movement of their arm is causing the window to open.  In order to test this
hypothesis they continue to lift up their arm and see if the window responds.  If the
window opens every time that they move their arm up then they are going to assume that
there is something connected to their arm which is causing the window to open.  The
only way they are able to come to this assumption is through testing their hypothesis
against an assumption of regularity in the world.  Searle claims that this assumption of
regularity is part of the Background.  
4.6 New Causation
Thompson's last argument against Searle's theory is that he only succeeds in
connecting Intentionality to causation by putting forth an entirely new sense of causation. 
Searle, however, does not attempt to put forth an entirely new sense of causation; his
reason for amending the standard regularity account of causation (an amendment which
can be considered as remaining friendly to that account) was to solve some problems that
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he saw with this account.  One of these problems is that the standard account does not
explain why we have the intuitive sense of perceiving causation all of the time. 
Thompson could argue that we are merely seeing regularities and projecting the concept
of causation onto them.  Searle responds to this position by claiming that the experience
of perceiving one event following another event is really quite different from the
experience of perceiving the second event as caused by the first.86  He attempts to justify
this statement by appealing to the researches of A. Michotte and J. Piaget which have
shown that our common sense view (that we can tell the difference between causation
and mere regularity) is correct.  Piaget studies the development of the notion of causation
among children.  He argues that children at first dont seem to have a line drawn between
causation and regularity.  Piaget outlines a type of causation seen in young children which
he calls phenomenistic causation.  This is where a child believes that one thing causes
another because of a spatial or temporal connection alone. Piaget argues that, early on in
childhood development, anything can produce anything; so long as two facts are given
together in raw observation, the one may be considered the cause of the other.87  By the
time children reach the age of six or seven they have the ability to distinguish between
actual causation and cases where there is just regularity, which justifies Searles claims
that there must be a phenomenal difference between the two cases.
Searles second problem is that the traditional account does not distinguish
between causal regularities and contingent regularities.  We dont claim that night causes
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day and, therefore, we must be able to distinguish between causation and other forms of
regularity.  This is a bad example because someone could argue that we know enough
now about night and day to see that it would be foolish to think that one causes the other,
but it is not inconceivable to think that someone not knowing things about the Sun could
be led to the mistaken assumption that night causes day.  Although Searle is correct in
claiming that this is a problem with the standard account, his theory does not solve this
problem either.  If we use our notion of making something happen and our background
assumption of regularities in order to discover causal relations outside of ourselves, then
there is little about the external world to enable us to distinguish between causal
regularities and regularities of another sort.   Searle claims that we can tell the difference
between causal regularities and other regularities but he never explains how the
experience of the two is different, other than just claiming that they are phenomenally
different.
According to Searle, the traditional account of causation also fails to distinguish
between causings and other causal relations, for example, between the billiard ball type of
causation where something is changed, and causings such as gravity where nothing is
altered.  Searles largest problem with the traditional account of causation is that it does
not tell us whether there are causes in the world or not.  In fact, Searle seems to worry
that the traditional account could lead one to a form of anti-realism about causation.  
Thompson condemns Searles theory of causation as being less clear about what
causation means than the traditional theory.  However, Thompsons problem here
appears to be based on a misreading of Searles intentions.  Searle claims quite clearly
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that he is only offering an amendment to the traditional account of causation, not a theory
of causation that is intended to replace it.  There are still a few unresolved problems with
Searles theory of Intentional causation, however.  Searles argument that we can tell the
difference between veridical perceptions and incorrect perceptions, between causation
and causings, and between causation and mere regularity relies upon the phenomenal
quality of these different cases.  Searle briefly mentions the work of Michotte and Piaget
but doesnt go into a detailed study of results in experimental psychology that may back
up his account.  While these results are irrelevant to Searles theory of childhood
development of causation (since Searle claims that he is not making any empirical claims
but merely showing how causation could develop) the research of many psychologists
seems to support the account that Searle gives.  Piagets notion of precausality can be
used to show that Searles theory of Intentional causation is at least a feasible theory of
the human view of causation, since it accords with the data that has been gathered.
4.7 Precausality
Piaget claims that in the early stages of childhood development the child makes no
distinction between the inner and the outer.  He argues that the world and the self are
one; neither term is distinguished from the other.88  Piaget claims that the childs world
view is characterized by the notion that things make efforts, and their powers imply an
internal and substantial energy analogous to our own muscular force.89  This early world
58
90Ibid., 259.
91Ibid., 261.
92Ibid., 262.
93Ibid., 263.
94Ibid., 267.
view colours the childs view of causation. The types of causal thinking found in children
that are significant for Searles theory of the development of causation in humans are: (i)
psychological causation, which is a tendency to take psychological motive as the cause
of everything,90  e.g., the clouds move because they want to move; (ii) magical
causation, where the subject regards his gestures, his thoughts, or the objects he
handles, as charged with efficacy, thanks to the very participations which he establishes
between those gestures, etc., and the things around him;91 and, (iii) artificialist causality,
where a given event is explained straight away by the intention or motive at the back of
it, but the child does not ask himself how the intention has worked itself out in action.92 
Piaget also claims that the final stage of development is where the child throws away the
notion of inanimate intentions, animism, etc., and develops a notion of causation whereby
there is explanation by reaction of the surrounding medium.93  Piaget continues: 
causality, like the whole of reality, is at first teeming with subjective
elements.  No distinction is drawn between motivation and physical
causality . . ., or between muscular and manual activity and mechanical
action . . ., or again between the influence of mind on body or of the
body on itself, and the influences of external objects on each other.94  
Piagets conclusions seem to support the description that Searle gives of the
development of causation in humans.  That early on children make no distinction between
causation in the external world and their causing things intentionally would seem to
support Searles view that the two notions develop simultaneously.  Piaget even seems to
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mirror Searles claims when he says that the world is interpreted by the very young child
in terms of his own I, the I in its turn is explained in terms of external experience.95 
Piaget argues that 
we do not therefore . . . begin by discovering internal causality and then
proceed to transfer it into objects.  Causality is the result of a sort of
bodily contact between organism and the world, which is prior to
consciousness and the self.96  
While Piagets conclusions seem to support Searles theory of Intentional
causation, Piagets notion of precausation is itself extremely controversial.  Pinard and
Laurendeau claim that Piagets systematization of the stages of a childs development of
causation has no existence in the mind of children.  On the contrary, the childs thinking
is disconcertingly incoherent.  Even when faced with a group of similar problems, the
child will not respond consistently.97  They claim the fact that the childs answers seem
to spring from a rigorous system is largely due to the questioning itself, which forces the
child to formulate explicit beliefs heretofore unexpressed and still relatively
uncommunicable.98  This is only a marginal criticism of Piaget since he himself claims
that 
the important thing to realize is that [children] have nothing with which
to replace this artificialism, whether they make up the details or not
they can only explain things by having recourse to human activity and
not to things themselves.99 
 
A far greater problem with Piagets account is that the replication of Piagets
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experiments, or the examination of children through comparable methods, does not
always elicit the primitive answers characteristic of precausal thinking.100   Piagets
methods are openly criticized by researchers who arrived at either little or no evidence of
precausation in children. Isaacs claims that the 
children examined by Piaget were subjected to conditions detrimental
to the manifestation of their real ability.  In [Isaacs] opinion, Piagets
clinical method is inadequate, the questions being too difficult or too
suggestive.101
However, it seems that asking children only questions geared toward types of causation
that they already understand will not tell us how the notion of causation is developed
since the child is only mimicking back what they have learned rather than what we are
truly looking for, viz., a childs intuitions about causation.
Most likely the real cause of differences in observed theories of causation among
children is that the samples of children taken in the studies that confirm precausal thinking
are much broader than those that dont.  Pinard and Laurendeau claim that 
it is worth noting that the great majority of investigators, undoubtedly
for the sake of convenience, restrict their sample to school children,
thus using subjects of at least six years of chronological age.  Moreover
since the questionnaires are frequently administered to groups, the
examiners must wait until children can read and write, which further
raises the minimal age of examination to eight or nine.102  
Piaget studied a group of children from age three to eleven and concluded that by age
seven or eight the existence of precausal thinking had tapered off.  Pinard and
Laurendeau note that a certain relationship seems to exist between the presence of
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precausal thinking and the age of subjects: the more negative the results, the older the
children submitted to the experiment.103  Pinard and Laurendeau conclude that 
the examination of the various factors capable of explaining these
conflicting data leads to hypotheses which cast some doubt mostly on
the negative conclusions.  When no instance of precausal thinking is
observed among children, the reason is frequently that the subjects
examined are too old; or else that the concept of precausality does not
have the same connotation for different investigators; or, finally, that
the techniques of analysis cunningly do away with indications of
primitive thinking.104
Thus it is only Piagets systematization of the childs notion of causality that is
called into question, not the actual existence of the precausal theories that support
Searles description of the development of causation.  Piagets description of the
development of causation, beginning with the childs failure to distinguish between
herself and the world which results in her interpreting causality as a case of something
making something happen, provides good evidence for Searles proposed theory of the
development of causation.  Also, the number of different distinctions that children make
between different types of causation seems to support Searles view that there is a
phenomenal difference between regularity, causation, and causings.
4.8 Emotions
Another pressing concern for Searles theory of Intentional causation is that
Searle appears to be studying only those cases of Intentionality that have a connection
between cause and object.  Since emotions do not appear to have the same direct
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connection between cause and object they provide a possible counter to Searles theory. 
That we can have a particular Intentional state of anger toward a person when the cause
of our anger is really that we have skipped lunch seems to imply that emotions, while they
are Intentional, have an entirely different structure from other Intentional states.  
This concern comes from mistaking Searles theory in the same way that Dretske
and Thompson have, however.  Searles theory of Intentionality does not rely upon a
direct connection between the cause of an Intentional state and the object of that
Intentional state (although in most cases this does appear to obtain) since the object of
almost every Intentional state can be mistaken.  All Searles theory of Intentional
causation, and subsequently Searles attempt to naturalize Intentionality, requires is that
there be a direct connection between the object and the world.  Since this connection
does not need to be a causal one, in the sense of the standard regularity theory of
causation, but can be a case of Intentional causation (meaning that the actual cause
need not be the same as the cause as requirement), emotions dont actually provide a
counter to Searles theory.  This is because our emotions do still have a connection to the
object that they are about in the same way that other Intentional states do.   
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Chapter Five  Biological Naturalism
The greatest significance for Searles theory of Intentionality is how it relates to
Searles theory of the mind as a whole.  Most philosophers argue that Searles theory of
Biological Naturalism is incoherent in that it relies upon property dualism as well as
reductionism while simultaneously claiming to reject both of these theories.  Code,
Dretske, Kim, and others claim that Searle cannot both attribute conscious states to the
brain and claim that those conscious states are irreducible.  I will argue that, not only is
Searles theory of Biological Naturalism coherent, but that it is actually the best option
philosophers have for solving the mind-body problem.  While Searle has been criticized
for trying to have his cake and eat it too I believe that, with certain amendments, his
theory actually succeeds at giving us a thoroughly naturalistic theory of the mind that
doesnt result in our losing certain elements of the mind that appear to be fundamentally
linked to the concept.  
Searle succeeds at this task by separating the ontological question of the mind
from the logical question of the mind.  The ontological question of the mind can be
answered quite simply by saying that the mind arises from brain states and is itself a
product of those brain states.  The claim that this story results in the loss of certain
essential characteristics of the mind, by which I mean qualia or Intentionality, confuses
questions about the content and logical function of mental states with the ontological
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question of mental states.  
I believe that Searles theory is redeemable, if we amend his theory so that
consciousness is irreducible, because mental states are different from other emergent
phenomena in that mental states have a logical structure.  This structure interests us as
much as, if not more than, questions about their instantiation.  Therefore, a description of
consciousness will ultimately require a description of the logical structure of mental states
as well as a description of their neurobiological instantiation.  Searles theory of
Intentionality is such a description and, together with Searles theory of Biological
Naturalism, results in a theory of the mind which solves the mind-body problem,
naturalizes the mind, and solves the problems of qualia and Intentionality.  
5.1 Searles Definition of Biological Naturalism
In the very beginning of The Mystery of Consciousness Searle asks how exactly
do neurobiological processes in the brain cause consciousness?105  It is already obvious
at this point that Searle is operating with a number of tacit assumptions.  Firstly, it is
obviously taken for granted that an account of consciousness should be a naturalistic
account.  By this I mean, rather trivially, that consciousness is a phenomenon that can,
and must, be explained by an appeal to the natural sciences.  Secondly, it is obvious that
consciousness is seen as a real property or phenomenon in need of explanation.  And
lastly, it is assumed that there is a link between consciousness and the brain and that this
link will be a causal one.  For the sake of brevity I will take these assumptions for granted
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in the same way that Searle does.  Thus it is assumed that consciousness is real, that any
connection between the mind and brain needs to be a causal one, and that naturalism is a
worthy goal.  What I will be examining is whether the account Searle offers is truly a
naturalistic one and, if not, whether it can be amended in such a way as to turn it into a
naturalistic account, in the process hopefully correcting some of the ambiguities seen in
Searles theory of consciousness.
Before examining these ambiguities I will briefly outline Searles theory of
consciousness.  Searles short definition is that 
consciousness refers to those states of sentience and awareness that
typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue
until we go to sleep again, or fall into a coma or otherwise become
unconscious.106  
This definition is trivial in the sense that it basically amounts to saying consciousness
refers to all of those states that arent unconscious; however, there is a non-trivial aspect
to this definition as well.  The non-trivial aspect would be that Searle is deviating from
some others in the field in claiming that consciousness doesnt refer to every aspect of
our mental lives but only those that we are aware of.  He claims later that, while
consciousness implies awareness, it isnt merely a synonym for awareness since
consciousness does not imply self-consciousness and we can be conscious, according to
Searle, without overt knowledge of what we are conscious of.
There are three other characteristics of Searles definition of consciousness that
serve to differentiate his theory.  The first is that he rejects the notion that we have a
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privileged epistemic status regarding our mental states, arguing that, in many cases, other
people are far better equipped to determine what our present state is than we are.  (In
defense of this he gives the oft used example of jealousy.)  The second is that Searle
claims that the notion of introspection is problematic in that it is really nothing more than
an extended metaphor that is philosophically useless.  He argues that introspection
implies that we have some form of perception that can be turned inward, which is not
only blatantly false, but also results in some wrong-headedness about the mind.  The
main reason for Searles rejection here is probably that the internal perception metaphor
perpetuates the outer/inner dichotomy between mind and the world that Searle wants to
reject.  The third characteristic of Searles conception of consciousness is that he
describes it as an on/off switch; a system is either conscious or not.  But once conscious,
the system is a rheostat: there are different degrees of consciousness.107   This is
important because it ultimately leads to his rejection of panpsychism or the idea that the
realization of consciousness doesnt depend upon the manner of realization.  
Once Searle has gotten rid of what, he believes, are the problematic assumptions
that certain philosophers of mind and laymen make about consciousness, he outlines the
positive claims that he wants to make about consciousness.  Searles definition of
consciousness can be condensed into his claim that consciousness . . .  is an inner,
first-person, qualitative phenomenon.108   Searle means a couple of different things by
inner here.  The first is the widely held belief that our conscious states are caused by
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something inside of ourselves (namely, our brain) and the second is that every conscious
state takes place within a set of other conscious states so that the identity of that state is
dependent upon its relation to other conscious states.  For example, my perception of a
book in front of me requires previous perceptions of other books in order for me to
identify this object as a book and may require previous perceptions of this very book in
order to identify it as the copy of Searles Intentionality that I have been studying from. 
Searle claims that conscious states are qualitative in the sense that there is a
specific qualitative character or feeling to every conscious state.  Here he explicitly
rejects the term qualia claiming that he does not want the baggage associated with
this term (by which I can only assume he means Dennetts annihilation of this term in
Quining Qualia109), but is referring to the common sense notion a lá Nagel that there is
something it is like to have a certain mental state.  By subjective Searle claims that he
means merely that conscious states are always experienced by a human or animal
subject.110   This he calls the first-person mode of existence or ontology which I will
speak about at length later. 
5.2 Emergentism
The motivation behind Searles biological naturalism is revealed when he says, "In
my view we need to abandon dualism and start with the assumption that consciousness is
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an ordinary biological phenomenon comparable with growth, digestion, or the secretion
of bile."111  Searle attempts to describe consciousness as a biological phenomenon yet
claims that consciousness cannot be reduced to neurobiological states.  In doing so, he
appeals to the concept of emergence.  Searle claims that 
consciousness is caused by lower-level neuronal processes in the brain
and is itself a feature of the brain.  Because it is a feature that emerges
from certain neuronal activities we can think of it as an "emergent
property" of the brain.112   
An emergent property, according to Searle, 
is a property that can be causally explained by the elements of a system,
but which is not itself a property of any of the individual elements of
the system and which cannot be explained simply as a summation of the
properties of those elements.113 
So mental properties are caused by brains, and can be causally explained by an appeal to
neurons etc., but mental properties cannot be reduced to properties of brains since mental
properties are not themselves a property of brains.  Searle attempts to explain emergence
by using the liquidity of water as an example.  The liquidity of water may be a bad choice
for an analogy here since the liquidity of water can be causally explained by studying the
underlying molecular makeup whereas mental properties, according to Searle, cannot be
exhaustively explained by appealing to the underlying molecular makeup of brains.  
The problem is that the emergent property of the mind cannot properly be
analogized to anything in the physical world, if this emergent property is characterized in
the way that Searle describes.  In asking us to imagine that the mind is a property that
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emerges from the neurons in the brain but yet cannot be reductively explained by those
neurons, we are required to assume that the mind is unlike any other physical
phenomenon.  Therein lies the problem.  Searle wants the mind to have a causal
connection to the brain since there is overwhelming evidence in favour of this view (i.e.
changes in the brain cause changes in the mind); however, Searle also seems to want to
say that the mind is something above and beyond these brain states.
In an attempt to clarify his position Searle distinguishes between emergence1 and
emergence2.  The former is explained by the causal interactions of the elements that make
it up and the latter is where something is emergent1 but has causal powers that can't be
explained by the causal interactions of the micro-elements.  Searle claims that
consciousness is emergent1 but not emergent2.  The properties that emerge from a system
Searle calls higher level properties.  He claims that atomic theory gave us the idea of
macro and micro; "that big systems are made up of little systems, but that many features
of the big ones can be causally explained by the behavior of the little ones".114  As an
example Searle uses the description of a car engine.  He claims that there are two levels
of explanation when describing how the engine works.  On the one level we have
descriptions of molecules and on the other level we have the movement of pistons etc.  
Again Searle is making use of an analogy that doesnt quite hold.  The
macro-workings of a car engine are explained by the micro-elements.  The reason why
there are two levels of explanation for how a car engine works is simply because it is
easier to speak of the workings of the engine in terms of pistons rather than molecules. 
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This seems to support the view that descriptions of the mind are useful folk-psychological
shortcuts but that they are not truly necessary for our description of the world.  Once
again it becomes obvious that the real problem with Searles position is that he tries to
have his cake and eat it too.  If Searle committed to either property dualism or to the
view that the mind can be reduced but that folk-psychological talk is still useful, his
theory would be more viable.
5.3 Subjective Consciousness 
The most obvious roadblock to Searles providing a successful naturalistic theory
of the mind is that in his definition of consciousness he claims that mental states are
inherently subjective, arguing that consciousness has first-person ontology.  This is
problematic since it leads to the verdicts of Kim, Code, et al. that Searle is really trying to
sneak a form of property dualism past the reader.  The most blatant problem with
characterizing consciousness as subjective is the argument that science, which is by
nature or definition objective, couldnt possibly study something that is by nature or
definition subjective.  Searle attempts to get past this problem by claiming that this
argument rests on a bad syllogism.  He argues that the terms objective and subjective
here have different senses (ontological vs. epistemic).  Epistemic objectivity or
subjectivity relates to propositions and ontological subjectivity or objectivity relates to
modes of existence.  
One serious problem would be that mode of existence is never properly defined
(all Searle does is equate first-person mode of existence with subjectivity).  The second
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problem is that, even if we accept that Searle has defeated the argument that a subjective
consciousness cant be studied by an objective science, he still hasnt given us any reason
to believe that science could study a subjective (ontological or epistemic) phenomenon. 
Another problem is that Searles later claim that the first-person ontology of
consciousness is why consciousness is irreducible seems to contradict his claim that
consciousness can be explained using the scientific method.  In claiming that mental states
have a first-person mode of existence or ontology Searle seems to be arguing not only
that mental states are ontologically subjective, but also that they are epistemically
subjective in that there is information or knowledge about a mental state that can only be
known by the person experiencing that state  basically Nagels what it is like quality.
Searles claim that consciousness is causally explainable yet still irreducible seems,
at best, property dualism and, at worst, blatant contradiction.  Jaegwon Kim articulates
this problem clearly by arguing that merely describing consciousness as a higher-level
feature of the brain doesnt do all the work required in order to claim that the mental is
physical.  Kim argues that in order for consciousness to be physical you have to also hold
that higher-level properties are reducible to lower-level properties.  Since Searle doesnt
believe that higher-level properties are reducible, his position must then be a form of
property dualism. 
Neil Manson goes even further to claim that describing consciousness as a higher
level property is not enough to naturalize it.  He argues that "surely consciousness is
unlike liquidity?  Consciousness is subjective.  Searle illustrates his conception of
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consciousness by citing objective higher-level properties".115  By arguing that Searle has
not succeeded in naturalizing consciousness here, Manson probably means that in order
for consciousness to be explainable in terms of the natural sciences Searle needs to
connect consciousness with the natural world more effectively than he has, rather than
that Searle has not succeeded in showing that consciousness is epistemically open (i.e.,
that consciousness cannot be explained or known at all).  Searles response would
presumably be along the lines that consciousness does not have to be emergent in exactly
the same way as other natural phenomenon in order for us to consider it a part of, or
explainable in terms of, the natural world.  Manson also appears to agree with Kim that
Searles position is contradictory in some way.  He argues that
surely [Searle] has to either (a) give up his claim about the irreducibility
of consciousness (and this would allow the analogy with liquidity and
digestion to hold) or (b) accept a dualist conception of mind, where
consciousness is an ontologically distinct feature of the world.116  
Alan Code, in my opinion, comes closer to describing Searles actual position yet
still gives a description of Searles theory that would result in its appearing to be property
dualism.  Code argues that what Searle is saying is that a neurobiological causal account
of consciousness is possible but that this causal account cant explain what makes a belief
a belief and what gives it the content that it has.  Code claims that Searle, in claiming that
the mind is inherently biological, is committed to the claim that all beliefs are realized in
the brain and that these beliefs take place in the brain.  Thus a belief is a property of the
brain which can be explained by appealing to neuroscience etc.; however, the properties
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of this property cannot be reduced or explained by appealing to the brain.  Thus Code
claims that what Searle is arguing is that mental states are a property of brain states but
that they are not reducible because of the fact that there are specific properties of these
mental states (their having truth value, propositional content etc.) which are not reducible
to brain states.  If Searle were arguing along the lines Code is suggesting, then clearly he
would be positing mental properties as well as physical properties.  However, this does
not appear to be what Searle is arguing.  Searles position seems to be, not that there are
both physical and mental properties, but that mental states form their own logical
category rather than their own ontological category.  Therefore, belief cannot be reduced
to neuron X firing because talk about beliefs involves talk about logical properties.  
According to Searles critics, Biological Naturalism is contradictory since it
involves accepting the claim that mental states are caused by brain states and yet rejects
the idea that mental states can be reduced to brain states.  Initially this seems to be
equivalent to the claim that there is an objective aspect to mental states that can be
reduced by science and there is a subjective aspect that cannot.  Criticisms of ambiguity,
or outright contradiction, are the biggest problem that Searles account of consciousness
has to face.  Searles claim that questions about what mental states are, are not
ontological questions at all  and thus cannot be reduced ontologically to other physical
things  successfully dodges this problem.  
5.4 Ontological vs. Causal Reduction
Searle attempts to solve his problems here by first distinguishing between
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ontological and causal reduction.  He argues that his view is causally reductive (the
causal powers of one thing are explainable in terms of those of another) but not
ontologically reductive (where one thing is seen as nothing but a collection of other
things).  Searle claims that while causal reductions lead to ontological reductions this
cant be done in the case of consciousness because a perfect science of the brain would
still not lead to ontological reduction of consciousness in the way that our present science
can reduce heat, solidity, color and sound.117   This he claims is because the first-person
mode of existence is essential to what we are referring to with the term conscious. 
Searle argues that heat, colour etc. are fundamentally different from consciousness
because what interests us about heat is not the subjective appearance but the underlying
physical causes.118  He argues that reduction of heat relies also upon an ability to
distinguish appearance from reality that cant be done with consciousness because the
appearance is the reality.  
This argument fails for a number of reasons.  First, I would argue that the story
science gives us of the world does not have to do with an appearance/reality distinction at
all, but that the real problem here is that the subjective or first-person nature of all
phenomena is always what is considered most important when we first begin to study a
phenomenon.  Surely what heat seemed to refer to before we got a story about the
movement of molecules was entirely the subjective phenomenon.  Thus the problem is
that the reductive explanation of heat led to a shift in the referent for that term where
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what we refer to by heat is now entirely objective and the subjective quality that was
previously referred to is moved to the realm of the mental.  One concern might be that if
we reduce consciousness in like manner then there will be nowhere else for feeling to go. 
This concern seems to rely upon a very deep misunderstanding of the notion of reduction,
however.  Mistaking reduction for elimination seems to be a common error among
non-reductionists.  I question whether Searle is mistaken in this same way, however,
since in his reply to Kim he states that the failure of reduction of consciousness is not so
much a problem about consciousness as it is about the ambiguities in the notion of
reduction.119   In customary Searlean manner the ambiguities he is referring to are never
pointed out and this statement is never clarified.  This causes me to suspect that when
Searle says that consciousness is not reducible he really means that consciousness is
not reducible, if you assume that reduction carries along with it certain baggage 
basically that high level properties would no longer be a correct way to speak of the
phenomenon.  This may seem to be an overly charitable interpretation of Searles
position.  In fact, Searle claims in later papers that this is an incorrect interpretation of his
position on reduction.  Whether this actually expresses his position, however, is irrelevant
for me in the sense that my point is merely that the only way Searles position could be
interpreted in a non-property-dualist sense would be if he did mean that consciousness is
not reducible if you assume that reduction carries along with it certain baggage 
basically that high level properties would no longer be a correct way to speak of the
phenomenon.    
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The next problem with Searles Biological Naturalism is that, according to Kim, it
results in overdetermination when mental events are caused by other mental events since
they have both a mental and a biological cause.  The problem with this, according to
Searle, is that it relies upon a naïve view of causation that only takes into account event
causation, i.e., it assumes that, since there are two different levels of description, both
cannot be causal descriptions because then mental events would suffer from
over-causation.  Searle claims that if we look at causation in a different sense, then it is
possible that the neurobiological processes in the brain cause consciousness and also
possible that consciousness causes other mental states because these are not different
events happening after a time lapse.  He goes back to the example of a car engine,
claiming that we dont say that there are extra causes here simply because we say that the
energy output of the engine is caused by the movement of pistons as well as the
conversion of gases.  Searle claims that Kim "thinks that the model of different levels or
layers of description of a system (call it levelism for short) is generated by the relation
'being a part,' that levelism is an instance of the part-whole relation.  But this is at best
misleading".120  Searle argues that "it is precisely because there are higher level features
of the system that we need levelism in the first place.121  He claims that Kims argument
for overdetermination is a consequence of the fact that "Kim is in the grip of the
traditional philosopher's Humean billiard ball conception of causation whereby causation
is always a relation among discrete events, and causes must temporally precede
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effects".122  Searle argues that with consciousness this type of causation is not what is
occurring.  Instead, causation in the realm of consciousness can be likened more to
something like gravity.  Searle claims that "in short, the same system admits of different
causal descriptions at different levels all of which are consistent and none of which
implies either over-determination or failure of causal closure.123   
The last, and most serious, problem with Searles account of consciousness is his
description of first-person modes of existence or ontology.  Searles position here
would be clearer if he spoke of logical vs. ontological levels of description as he does in
Intentionality rather than speaking of first-person vs. second-person ontology.  This is
because the latter terminology implies that Searle is claiming that mental states have their
own ontological category (which he explicitly denies in later writings).  In fact, Searle
argues that questions about what mental states are are not ontological questions at all. 
He argues that it is the logical properties of beliefs that are important, not the ontological
category.  The problem, according to Searle, is that we can ask two questions about
mental states.  The first is what is a belief qua belief? to which we get an answer about
logical structure and the second is what is the mode of existence of beliefs? to which
we get a neurobiological answer. To me Searles position seems to be that talk about the
logical structure of mental states cant be reduced to biological talk, a position which
implies neither property dualism nor non-naturalism.  Therefore, an explanation of what
mental states are will not rely upon physical descriptions at all but will require a
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description of the logical structure of mental states.  
In Intentionality this is precisely what Searle provides.  Thus I take the arguments
in Intentionality to be doing far more work that Searle claims that they do.  Not only are
these arguments attempting to naturalize Intentionality, but they also give us a conclusive
answer to the questions what are mental states? and what is the mind?      
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Chapter Six - Conclusion
While my characterization of Searles theory of the mind is possibly overly
charitable to the point where it can no longer be considered his theory, I believe that this
interpretation results in a clearer position that does not suffer from the apparent
contradictions implicit in Searles articulated theory.  The claim that qualia and
Intentionality can both be explained by studying the logical structure of mental states
rather than by studying their instantiation or ontological character results in a theory of
mind that can be studied by the natural sciences yet still accounts for the characteristics of
the mind that common sense tells us need to be accounted for.  
My proposal here may still be thought to be subject to one of the criticisms of
Searles theory, in that the claim that mental states have a logical structure that cannot be
reduced to any other phenomenon may imply property dualism, or worse, some form of
supernaturalism.  My claims here, however, are not that this logical structure cant be
explained by appeals to other natural phenomenon, just that it cant be reduced to other
phenomenon.  This is not due to the nature of consciousness itself but rather to our
interests in studying the mind.  So to say that this logical structure is irreducible is merely
a rejection of certain baggage that comes with the notion of reduction: namely, that
reductive accounts tend to lead to elimination, which we do not want for the mind, and
that reductionist explanations imply a hierarchy of explanations.  Reductive explanations
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in science tend to be seen as the right explanation, whereas higher-level descriptions are
seen as wrong in some sense.  Thus when we talk of the colour red what we are really
talking about is a wavelength of 650 nm.  To speak of the colour red is not seen as
correct or as accurate a description as speaking of the wavelength would be.  
Saying that consciousness is different from other natural phenomenon in that it
has a logical structure that interests us as much, if not more, than the ontological
structure, still does not solve the problem of the mind.  A cohesive and complete account
of what this logical structure is would still be necessary.  Searles theory of Intentionality
is a good first step toward developing such a theory.  Searles theory of Intentionality has
described the logical structure of conscious states, naturalized Intentionality, and shown
how this characteristic could develop in human beings.  Searle has also answered all of
the questions outlined in the introduction: what it would mean for an Intentional state to
be true, how Intentional states can refer to non-existent objects, what the connection is
between Intentionality, mental states, and consciousness, and whether the content of an
Intentional state is determined internally to the agent having the Intentional state or
externally.  Searles theory of Intentionality is also appealing in that it solves the problem
of particularity, the problem of fortuitous satisfaction, and Putnams underdetermination
problem, and results in a naturalized account.
However, it could be argued that the theories that Searle proposes for dealing
with all of these problems are ad hoc.  Many of the characteristics of Intentionality that
Searle outlines (the Background, the Network, and intrinsic Intentionality) seem to have
been contrived for the purpose of solving these problems rather than for describing actual
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characteristics of Intentionality.  The Background and the Network are proposed in order
to solve the underdetermination problem, the particularity problem, and to halt a possible
regress of Intentionality.  The only explanation that Searle offers for positing the
Background and the Network that is not ad hoc appears to be his description of rules that
are internalized to the point where they are no longer Intentional, which explanation we
have already seen to fail.  Searle claims, however, that the existence of the Background is
experientially verifiable, which would mean that his positing a Background is based upon
something other than the need to solve the particularity and underdetermination
problems.  He describes a visiting colleague who becomes convinced of the Background
when he experiences an earthquake for the first time and realizes that, while the fact that
the earth doesnt move was something that was behind the formulation of many of his
Intentional states, this belief had never really been Intentional itself.
Searles motivation for the distinction between intrinsic and derived Intentionality
was justified merely by the fact that without this distinction everything becomes
potentially mental.  Obviously, philosophers who reject this distinction and appeal to
non-mental Intentional objects in order to naturalize Intentionality do not feel that this
loss of contrast is a problem.  Searles distinction here is justifiable since he could argue
that conflating the mental with the non-mental results in a definition of Intentionality that
no longer differentiates anything and thus merely dodges the problem of Intentionality
rather than truly solving it.
In order for Searles theory of Intentionality and the mind to be truly justified, a
more extended examination of the Background and Searles distinction between intrinsic
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and derived Intentionality is needed.  Certain assumptions underlying my entire treatment
of this topic, namely, internalism and Intentional realism, would obviously also need to be
justified.  Also required is a more extended discussion of the nature of reduction and
further justification of Searles use of common sense as justification.  Despite the fact
that I have not yet been able to deal with all of these topics, I believe that I have
nonetheless shown that, at the very least, Searles theory of Intentionality and the mind
offers far more promise than it is usually given credit for, and, at the most, that it is a
serious contender for the beginnings of a solution to the problem of consciousness. 
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